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PPB No.24  2/17/99  3:13 PM  Page 2The year 1994 was the fiftieth anniversary of the signing at Bre t t o n
Wo ods, New Hampshire, of the Articles of Agreement of the
I n t e rnational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Many
a d d resses at anniversary celebrations praised the contributions of the
IMF and World Bank, but they were overshadowed by the widely
held conviction that both institutions are seriously in need of over-
hauling. However, there is no consensus on how they should be
changed. Some analysts believe that one or both have outlived their
usefulness and should be abolished, while others believe that they
should continue to operate, but with new responsibilities, new org a-
nization, and enhanced re s o u rc e s .
Underlying the proposals to alter or abolish these institutions is the
belief that neither is able to deal with the world’s current economic
p roblems. The IMF has had virtually no influence on the intern a-
tional monetary system since the early 1970s, nor has it had a laud-
able re c o rd in promoting balance of payments equilibrium and
financial stability in the developing countries. The World Bank has
fallen short of achieving its primary goals of reducing world povert y
and putting the world’s poorest countries on the path to sustainable
d e v e l o p m e n t .
In this Public Policy Brief, Raymond F. Mikesell outlines the original
goals of the IMF and World Bank and the activities they have
assumed as they evolved and evaluates the success of the institutions
in meeting both past and subsequent goals. He analyzes the curre n t
debate about whether the IMF should play a more active role in
managing the international monetary system, in managing curre n c y
crises (such as the one recently experienced in Mexico), and in pro-
viding credit to newly capitalist countries. Mikesell examines pro-
posals that the World Bank do more to promote private investment
in developing countries, make more loans for expanding social and
economic objectives (such as reducing povert y, promoting gre a t e r
equality of opport u n i t y, improving health and education, and 
maintaining the environment), and improve the efficiency of its 
o p e r a t i o n s.
S u m m a ry
PPB No.24  2/17/99  3:13 PM  Page 3Mikesell cautions that he cannot state his conclusions with unequivo-
cal conviction or passion; the issues are too complex, the arg u m e n t s
on both sides of the debate too persuasive, and the reputations of the
debators too impressive. Given the large financial re s o u rces and the
highly competent staffs of the IMF and World Bank, Mikesell feels
that the two institutions should be doing a better job promoting trade
and reducing povert y. However, because there is general agre e m e n t
that there is a need for multilateral institutions to promote world
trade and reduce world povert y, he feels that abolishing the institu-
tions is not an appropriate response. Rather, he recommends that 
(1) the World Bank Group and IMF should be merged to form a single
o rganization, the World Bank and Fund Group (WBFG), with one
executive director for both institutions; (2) neither the IMF nor the
WBG should be given responsibility for establishing and managing an
exchange rate target zone system or for stabilizing the exchange rates
of the major currencies; (3) the establishment of additional institu-
tional constructs to deal with financial crises should be deferred; (4)
the WBG should move rapidly to change the composition of its lend-
ing by making fewer loans to governments and state enterprises and
i n c reasing its loans to the private sector, including nongovern m e n t a l ,
n o n p rofit entities; and (5) the WBG should be gradually downsized by
reducing the number of countries eligible for loans.
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The fiftieth anniversary of the 1944 Bretton Wo ods agreement caused
many to reflect on the stru c t u re of the international monetary system and
the usefulness of the institutions created by the agreement. Some, includ-
ing former chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Vo l c k e r, have called for
the re t u rn to a managed monetary system in which exchange rates are
not allowed to float fre e l y, but are held within a set range of rates. 
An argument for managing rates is that it would reduce the volatility of
exchange rate movements, a volatility that introduces uncertainty into
global economic decision making. Those who argue in favor of maintaining
the current floating rate system assert that even if an appropriate range of
rates could be determined and could be agreed upon by the leading indus-
trialized nations, the size of currency interventions necessary to affect those
rates is too large (relative to total market activity) for central banks to
u n d e rtake. More o v e r, in order to maintain exchange rates within a given
band of values, central banks might have to sacrifice some freedom in their
use of monetary and fiscal policies to achieve domestic objectives. Another
issue is determining who would have oversight powers in such a system. 
Some propose that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) be more
active in the international monetary system, managing currency crises
and providing credit to newly capitalist countries. Others, however, note
that it has had virtually no influence on the international monetary sys-
tem since the 1970s and its re c o rd in promoting balance of payments
equilibrium and financial stability in developing countries is not laud-
able. According to such critics, the IMF should be abolished or at least its
functions should be reduced or combined with those of the World Bank.
P re f a c e
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In this Public Policy Brief Raymond F. Mikesell analyzes the merits of these
a rguments, reviews the success of the institutions in accomplishing their
original functions, describes other roles they have perf o rmed, and makes
recommendations for re f o rm . He notes that the IMF’s functions changed
after the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods par value system broke down
and exchange rates were allowed to float. He proposes that, because
some of the IMF’s operations overlap those of the World Bank, the two
institutions should be combined. One area of overlap is aid to Eastern
European countries to assist them in the transformation to market-based
economies. Mikesell notes, “the IMF’s functions in these countries are
not only far removed from those for which it was designed, but there is
little to distinguish IMF eff o rts from those of the World Bank.”
Moreover, “the IMF’s lending programs in Russia and some other newly
capitalist countries have not been successful in promoting their transi-
tion to capitalism or improving their balance of payments.” 
T h e re is a question of whether aid to the Eastern European countries to
develop a capitalist economy should be provided by the IMF and the
World Bank or directly by the governments of the We s t e rn industrialized
nations. IMF loans are supposed to be conditional upon a country ’s success
in changing the economic and political stru c t u re of its economy. However,
the decision as to whether to grant a loan may be difficult for an intern a-
tional agency. This difficulty is best illustrated by the politics surro u n d i n g
the approval of the pending $9 billion loan by the IMF to Russia.
Although some economic pro g ress (lower inflation and stabilization of the
ruble within a narrow range) was seen in Russia during 1995, political
changes have led to uncertainties about the direction of future market
re f o rms. A refusal to grant the loan, based on these economic considera-
tions alone, would be seen as a vote against the Russian leaders’ ability to
pursue market re f o rms and could cripple the Russian economy. More o v e r,
P resident Clinton has urged the IMF to approve the loan. If the United
States and other We s t e rn nations feel that factors other than economic
changes must be considered, it might be best, as some have suggested, that
the loans be made directly by those governments. Mikesell’s insights into
these issues can serve as a basis for discussion of international monetary
p ro b l e m s .
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Executive Director
February 1996
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The year 1994 was the fiftieth anniversary of the signing in Bre t t o n
Wo ods, New Hampshire, of the Articles of Agreement of the
I n t e rnational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The anniver-
s a ry was celebrated at meetings in Washington, D.C., Bretton Wo od s ,
and Madrid.1 As one of the few surviving participants of the Bre t t o n
Wo ods conference, I was privileged to attend the first two commemora-
tions. The many addresses at the 1994 meetings praising the contribu-
tions of the IMF and the World Bank were overshadowed by the widely
held conviction that both institutions are seriously in need of overh a u l-
ing. However, there is no consensus on how they should be changed.
Some analysts believe that one or both have outlived their usefulness
and should be abolished, while others believe that they should continue
to operate, but with new responsibilities, new organization, and
enhanced re s o u rc e s .
Underlying the proposals to alter or abolish these institutions is the
belief that neither is able to deal with the world’s current economic
p roblems. There is great dissatisfaction with the present intern a t i o n a l
m o n e t a ry system. The IMF has had virtually no influence on the system
since the early 1970s, nor has it had a laudable re c o rd in promoting bal-
ance of payments equilibrium and financial stability in the developing
countries. The World Bank has fallen short of its primary goals of
reducing world poverty and putting the world’s poorest countries on the
path to sustainable development.
P roposals for Reforming the
I n t e rnational Monetary Institutions
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The IMF and the World Bank were designed to help avoid the chaotic
financial conditions that prevailed during the 1930s and to facilitate the
transition to a post–World War II economy that would be characterized
by stable exchange rates, the absence of exchange restrictions on trade,
and readily available capital for financing postwar re c o n s t ruction and
the development of poor countries. Under the 1944 agreement the IMF
was expected to promote a new international monetary order by estab-
lishing and enforcing rules governing exchange rates and fore i g n
exchange transactions and by providing assistance to help countries con-
form to these rules; the World Bank was expected to help reduce world
poverty and to assist in economic development by promoting private and
public capital flows into developing countries.
Owing to the magnitude of the financial re q u i rements for re c o n s t ru c t i o n
and to the balance of payments problems of the European countries, nei-
ther the IMF nor the World Bank played a significant role during the
immediate postwar period. The Marshall Plan provided most of the
financing for European re c o v e ry, while the European Payments Union
(EPU) established a payments system that permitted multilateral intra-
E u ropean trade and paved the way for the operation of the IMF par value
system based on the gold-convertible dollar implemented in the 1960s.2
By the end of the 1960s the principal threat to the par value system was the
weakness of the dollar itself. Worldwide economic re c o v e ry brought about a
change in trade patterns and capital markets resulting in the replacement of
the dollar shortage of the 1950s with a dollar surplus in the late 1960s. The
t e rmination of dollar convertibility into gold in 1971 and the abandonment
of eff o rts to maintain fixed exchange rates by the major countries in 1973 left
the IMF with little influence on the international monetary system. The
B retton Wo ods monetary system was dead, and few expected it to be re v i v e d .
The IMF found its niche in providing advice and making loans to devel-
oping countries under a variety of programs. These loans had little to do
with exchange rate stability; in fact, the preloan agreements often
re q u i red devaluation along with trade and exchange liberalization.
Although some of the loans assisted countries during crises re s u l t i n g
f rom sudden declines in export income, most were designed to induce
Revisiting Bretton Woods
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countries to reform those economic policies that had contributed to bal-
ance of payments disequilibrium.
Since it began operations in 1946, the World Bank has been almost
completely occupied with assistance to developing countries. Although
the World Bank’s charter emphasized its role in promoting the flow of
private capital, the bulk of its loans have been made to govern m e n t s .
During the 1950s lending by the World Bank was hampered by a short-
age of projects that met the standards of commercial bank loans as inter-
p reted by successive World Bank presidents, all of whom, except for
Robert McNamara, were products of the American banking community.
In the beginning most World Bank loans were for specific infrastructure
p rojects such as large dams, power, and transportation, but the idea 
slowly emerged that the World Bank should be a development institu-
tion concerned with social welfare and eliminating poverty.
The lending capacities of both the IMF and the World Bank incre a s e d
steadily from their inauguration in 1946. By the end of fiscal year (FY)
1994 outstanding credits provided by the IMF totaled about $45 billion. In
addition, the IMF has allocated to its members 21 billion special drawing
rights (SDRs), which the members can use to buy the currencies of other
m e m b e r s .3 Most of the increases in the IMF’s re s o u rces have occurred with
p e r i odic increases in member quotas, determining both the capital sub-
scriptions to the IMF and how much members can normally borro w.
World Bank loans outstanding at the end of FY 1994 totaled $109 bil-
lion, with annual loans averaging $14 to $17 billion annually between
FY 1990 and FY 1994. The World Bank also manages an associate orga-
nization, the International Development Association (IDA), which
loaned about $6.6 billion in 1994. Another World Bank associate, the
I n t e rnational Finance Corporation (IFC), provides equity and debt
financing to private enterprise in developing countries; in FY 1994 it
committed $2.5 billion. A third associate, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), promotes foreign direct investment in
developing countries by offering political risk investment insurance.
Together these four institutions make up the World Bank Gro u p
(WBG). The World Bank and the IDA operate under the same manage-
ment, but with diff e rent sources of funding. The IFC and the MIGA
have both separate managements and separate sources of funding.
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The major proposals for changing the functions and organization of the
IMF relate to its role in the international monetary system. One proposal
is to give the IMF an important function in remodeling the international
monetary system. A counterproposal is to merge the IMF and the World
Bank because the IMF no longer plays a significant role in the interna-
tional monetary system, and its assistance to developing countries dupli-
cates the activities of the World Bank. The analysis of altern a t i v e
i n t e rnational monetary systems in the following paragraphs provides a
basis for evaluating these contrasting proposals.4
Managed Versus Floating Exchange Rates
Prior to World War I the gold standard provided a system of fixed
exchange rates and automatic balance of payments adjustment by allow-
ing gold movements to affect the money supply. During World War I
most countries went on a managed currency system and several, includ-
ing the United Kingdom and France, returned to a gold parity system in
the 1920s. In the 1930s exchange rates were neither fixed nor fre e l y
floating, but were managed in a way that resulted in restricted and dis-
criminatory trade. The United Kingdom abandoned the gold standard in
1931. In 1933 the dollar was allowed to float, but the United States
went back on the gold convertible standard in early 1934. The Bretton
Woods system of fixed but adjustable parities was a compromise between
the gold standard and a managed system. Following the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods par value system in the early 1970s, the major cur-
rencies were allowed to float with occasional attempts to manage them,
a condition that continues to exist today.
T h e re is substantial dissatisfaction with the current floating rate system.
T h e re have been large swings in exchange rates between major curre n c i e s ,
but these fluctuations have not promoted a satisfactory pattern of curre n t
account balances. In part i c u l a r, there has been dissatisfaction with trade
balances, which make up a substantial pro p o rtion of current account bal-
a n c e s .5 The fluctuations in exchange rates have occurred largely as a con-
sequence of capital movements generated by interest rate diff e re n t i a l s
among the countries, cyclical movements in national business conditions,
Revisiting Bretton Woods
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p a rt of the central banks to influence them, are equilibrium rates in the
sense that demand for and the supply of foreign exchange from all sourc e s
a re equal, but such equilibrium rates may not be compatible with the cur-
rent account balances that governments desire. For example, Japan may
want a large trade surplus, but the United States and European countries
may not want trade deficits. What governments would like to have is a
combination of (1) equilibrium rates, (2) satisfactory current account bal-
ances, and (3) relatively stable rates. The controversy over managed versus
f reely floating rates is a controversy over which system will most closely
a p p roximate these conditions.
Milton Friedman (1953) has argued for half a century that exchange rates
should be determined in free markets with no attempt to control them.
Exchange rates determined in free markets will always be equilibrium rates,
and if governments prevent inflation by properly controlling the supply of
m o n e y, exchange rate fluctuations will be moderate. Friedman’s position is
echoed by many leading economists tod a y. For example, in his address to
the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in January
1995, George P. Schultz (former secre t a ry of state and former University of
Chicago professor of economics) stated that “We should stop worry i n g
about the exchange system. We now have a dirty float. . . . The system
would work better if it were cleaner, that is, with less government interv e n-
tion. But the system does in fact work reasonably well and has done so over
a twenty-year period during which the system has experienced and
absorbed some tumultuous economic changes” (Schultz 1995, 3).
The argument for managing exchange rates is that a freely floating rate
system results in wide exchange rate fluctuations, which do not con-
tribute to orderly balance of payments adjustments and may impair
trade. Central banks can stabilize exchange rates to those approximating
equilibrium over the intermediate run and can alter them when funda-
mental economic conditions render such rates incompatible with equi-
librium. If a country has a trade or current account deficit, the central
bank can adjust the exchange rate to reduce or eliminate the deficit.
Thus, managed rates provide a means of adjusting the trade or current
account, while freely fluctuating rates, which respond to speculative and
other temporary forces, may at times be inappropriate for achieving the
desired trade or current account balance. A change in the exchange rate
Proposals for Reforming the International Monetary Institutions
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domestic and foreign prices of a country’s exports and imports. For exam-
ple, if Mexico reduces the value of the peso in terms of the dollar, peso
prices of U.S. goods will rise, so that Mexicans will buy less from the
United States. In addition, the dollar will buy more pesos, so that the
prices of Mexican goods to U.S. consumers will decline and Mexico will
sell more goods to the United States.
T h e re are, however, some problems with this analysis. First, re l a t i v e
prices of many internationally traded goods do not immediately adjust to
changes in exchange rates. If the U.S. dollar were to depreciate by 10
percent in terms of a composite of all foreign currencies, the dollar prices
of imports would not immediately rise by 10 percent because some for-
eign suppliers in competition with domestic producers would not raise
their U.S. prices by that amount. And some U.S. exporters would raise
their dollar prices to maintain the foreign currency prices of their
exports. Second, even when prices are adjusted to reflect a change in the
exchange value of a curre n c y, consumers are often sluggish in shifting
purchases from foreign to domestic sources. Because of these two factors,
the immediate effect of a currency depreciation may be to worsen the
trade balance for a few months, after which improvement may take place
gradually over a couple of years. This initial worsening of the trade bal-
ance after depreciation followed by a gradual improvement over time is
sometimes called the J-curve effect (Krugman 1991, ch. 2).
A third reason why changing the exchange rate may not improve the
current account balance relates to macroeconomic conditions. If a coun-
try’s current account balance is to improve, there must be an increase in
that country’s total output relative to its total expenditures on consump-
tion and investment. The current account balance must always equal the
difference between national output and total expenditures. This identity
may be expressed as
CA = Y – (C + I) – G
where CA is the current account, Y is national output, C is private con-
sumption, I is private domestic investment, and G is government spend-
ing.6 In order to improve the current account, there must be an increase
in Y, a decrease in domestic expenditures (C + I + G) with more of the
Revisiting Bretton Woods
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place only if depreciation is accompanied by the appropriate macroeco-
nomic adjustments, but appreciation alone will not automatically pro-
duce these adjustments. If depreciation stimulates inflation, domestic
expenditures may rise relative to output. Also, inflation may nullify the
e ffects of depreciation on the increase in import prices relative to the
prices of domestic goods and on the decrease in export prices in terms of
f o reign currencies so that the trade balance will not improve. Under
these conditions, currency depreciation may fail to improve the current
account balance (Mikesell 1995, 12–15). For example, the U.S. current
account deficit was $7 billion in 1991 and $68 billion in 1992, but rose
to over $100 billion in both 1993 and 1994, despite a more than 40 per-
cent decline in the value of the dollar in terms of the Japanese yen
between 1990 and 1994 and a somewhat smaller depreciation of the dol-
lar in terms of the German mark. 
Other factors—such as a rise in private investment, a decline in personal
saving, and a substantial budget deficit—contributed to the curre n t
account deficit. Over the long run a country’s trade and current account
balances will respond to a change in the real exchange rate (the nominal
rate adjusted for relative changes in domestic versus foreign prices), but
over the intermediate run the balance may be affected by a variety of
macroeconomic factors. 
Some analysts doubt the ability of central bankers and finance ministers to
identify equilibrium exchange rates or to know how far rates ought to
change to re s t o re balance of payments equilibrium (for example, Kru g m a n
1990, ch. 14.) With open capital markets and instant information about
economic conditions affecting securities markets and interest rates,
exchange markets react to changes in fundamental conditions that may
a ffect the balance of payments almost as soon as the re s e a rch staffs of cen-
tral banks and finance ministries process the information. By the time gov-
e rnments get around to making policy changes, a substantial capital
movement may have already occurred. An anticipated depreciation may
result in massive capital flight, while an anticipated currency appre c i a t i o n
may induce inward capital movements and further appreciation accompa-
nied by a larger current account deficit. These conditions greatly compli-
cate the problem of setting target rates that are both consistent with
equilibrium and likely to remain stable. Those who favor freely floating
Proposals for Reforming the International Monetary Institutions
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
PPB No.24  2/17/99  3:13 PM  Page 15rates argue that by allowing rates to be determined in the market, the rates
will always be at the equilibrium level, and sudden large changes in rates,
which may occur under a managed rate system, are more harmful to trade
and investment than small movements under a fully floating system.
I n s t ruments for Managing Exchange Rates
The principal instruments for managing exchange rates are (1) central
bank intervention in the exchange market, (2) changes in short - t e rm
interest rates, and (3) fiscal policy. The first two are usually controlled by
central banks, while fiscal policy is controlled by governments, both the
administration and the legislature. Central banks do attempt to aff e c t
exchange rates with the instruments at their disposal, but governments
rarely attempt to affect exchange rates with fiscal policy.
Central bank intervention in the exchange market is of two types: steril-
ized and unsterilized. In unsterilized intervention, purchases of fore i g n
currencies on exchange markets with domestic currency or purchases of
domestic currency with foreign exchange are allowed to have their full
impact on the country ’s bank re s e rves and, there f o re, on interest rates
and quantity of money. However, most intervention is sterilized; that is,
the effect of exchange market activity on the money supply is offset by
central banks through open market operations. The record of success of
sterilized intervention in keeping exchange rates within an agreed range
is poor (Humpage 1993, 2–16; Obstfeld 1990, ch. 5). Although inter-
vention serves as a signal to the market of the official view of the gov-
ernment on exchange rate policy, the volume of intervention tends to be
too small in relation to total market activity to affect the rate substan-
t i a l l y. For example, in the period from January to March 1995, during
which the dollar was under substantial downward pressure, U.S. mone-
tary authorities intervened in the total amount of $1.42 billion against
the deutsche mark and the yen; nevertheless, the exchange value of the
dollar continued to decline in terms of these currencies. In early March
1995 the Federal Reserve, in collaboration with a number of European
central banks, intervened to support the dollar; the Fed purchased $450
million against the deutsche mark and $370 million against the yen.
A c c o rding to a re p o rt published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
Revisiting Bretton Woods
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York (1995), “The dollar met aggressive selling by market part i c i p a n t s
and proceeded to trade pro g ressively lower.” Such small interv e n t i o n s
cannot have much effect on a world currency market with daily transac-
tions currently exceeding $1 trillion. A truly massive intervention could
almost certainly stabilize the dollar for a time, but could prove costly if
the stabilized rate proved to be untenable.
S h o rt - t e rm interest rates are sometimes increased by central banks in ord e r
to support the exchange value of a curre n c y. The German Bundesbank cut
its discount rate from 4.5 percent to 4.0 percent on March 30, 1995, to sup-
p o rt the dollar (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1995, 9). A similar
reduction taken at the same time by the Bank of Japan was probably for the
same reason. There is little indication that recent U.S. Federal Reserv e
i n t e rest rate policy has been motivated by a desire to support the dollar.7
I n t e rnational Coordination to Manage Exchange Rates
Efforts to manage exchange rates are likely to be more successful when
several countries coordinate their policies than when a country acts
alone. Assuming the major economic powers were to reach an agre e-
ment on a set of desirable exchange rates, they could coordinate their
monetary and fiscal policies and central bank operations in an effort to
s u p p o rt these rates or to maintain them within a specified range.
Countries with strong currencies would reduce their short-term interest
rates and their budget surpluses, while countries with weak curre n c i e s
would increase their interest rates and eliminate their budget deficits.
But such measures might well be in conflict with the domestic objectives
of the countries trying to coordinate. 
M o n e t a ry and fiscal coordination is provided in the Maastricht Tre a t y
(signed by the members of the European Union, or EU), which looks
t o w a rd the establishment of a European Monetary Union (EMU).
However, coordination is much more difficult for countries outside the
EU because they do not have the same arrangements for mutual assis-
tance or the common political and economic goal of monetary union.
C o o rdinating financial policies in the interest of stabilizing exchange
rates raises the question of whether and to what extent nations should
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gains from exchange rate stabilization worth the sacrifice of domestic
objectives?  Empirical evidence is not conclusive and most governments
do not favor sacrificing domestic objectives to promote exchange rate
stability. This has been an issue even in efforts to form the EMU. Some
countries, notably France and Germ a n y, seem willing to subord i n a t e
domestic objectives to achieve permanently fixed exchange rates and a
common currency, but the United Kingdom has been unwilling to do so.
P roposals for Changing the Functions and Organization 
of the IMF
Traditional Role of the IMF 
The traditional purpose of IMF assistance has been to help countries
achieve balance of payments equilibrium without re s o rting to trade or
exchange restrictions on imports of goods or services, defaulting on
i n t e rnational debt, budgetary actions falling heavily on the poor, or
reducing investments important to economic growth. Over the past
decade the IMF introduced two new loan facilities that differ from its
traditional assistance. One is the structural adjustment facility (SAF),
which provides loans on very liberal terms—an interest rate of only 0.5
percent and repayments over 5 1/2 to 10 years—in support of macroeco-
nomic re f o rms and structural adjustments. SAF loans are accompanied
by detailed agreements on programs that the borrowing country may
engage in, such as the allocation of domestic credits, the privatization of
state enterprises, price controls, and trade regulations, all of which go
beyond the usual macroeconomic adjustments. 
Not all of the SAFs have succeeded in achieving balance of payments
i m p rovement and satisfactory economic growth. There have been sev-
eral outright failures, especially in the African countries, notably Zambia
and Zaire. In some of these countries economic pro g ress has been
impaired by civil wars and irresponsible dictators. As of FY 1994, IMF
obligations in arrears totaled 2.9 billion SDRs ($4.3 billion). Many
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countries would probably default on their repurchase agreements to the
IMF if they could not continue to receive new loans. Hence, repayments
a re not being made from improvements in the balance of payments.
According to Peter Kenen (1994a, 34), “It is time to concede that the
[ I n t e rnational Monetary] Fund and the [World] Bank have been
involved in the de facto rescheduling of their claims on a number of
developing countries that cannot possibly repay them.” Assistance from
the IMF has undoubtedly helped some countries, such as Korea, liberal-
ize their economies and achieve reasonable growth rates. On the other
hand, it may be argued that the absence of financial assistance from the
IMF might force countries to institute economic re f o rms more rapidly
and avoid accumulating external indebtedness.
The second IMF facility, the “systemic transformation facility,” was cre-
ated in 1993 to assist former Soviet countries with transforming their
economies to private enterprise and free markets. Such assistance
involves problems quite different from those in most developing coun-
tries, in which private economies with established markets, credit insti-
tutions, and reasonably functioning systems of monetary control already
exist. An IMF task in assisting the former Soviet countries has been to
f o rmulate national plans for establishing new financial institutions to
mobilize and allocate credit and for creating the capital markets required
for transferring ownership from the state to the private sector. The IMF’s
functions in these countries are not only far removed from those for
which it was designed, but there is little to distinguish IMF efforts from
those of the World Bank, which is operating in the same countries.
The IMF’s lending programs in Russia and some other newly capitalist
countries have not been successful in promoting their transition to
capitalism or improving their balance of payments. Privatization has
been slow and trade has fallen sharply, partly as a result of the collapse
of ruble-based trade and the shortage of foreign exchange to finance
trade (Black 1994, 265–272). However, since chaotic political and
social conditions seem to have been the major barriers to a smooth
transition, such a transition may perhaps be more a political than an
economic matter. There f o re, it might be argued that coordinated assis-
tance from the NATO countries is more appropriate than IMF (or
World Bank) assistance.
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Exchange Rate Management as a Multilateral Eff o rt
P roposals for giving the IMF a more active role in the intern a t i o n a l
m o n e t a ry system involve the question of whether exchange rate man-
agement should be a multilateral effort. Every country’s exchange rate is,
by definition, of concern to its major trading partners. Attempts to stabi-
lize or otherwise control an exchange rate require international coopera-
tion, since the action of an individual country to lower the exchange
value of its currency could be countered by other countries.
If there is to be multilateral action to control exchange rates, the selection
of any exchange rate to be maintained or kept within a particular range
should be made within the context of an agreed upon pattern of rates of all
major currencies. More o v e r, the agreed pattern must take into account the
p a t t e rn of current account balances with which the rates must be consis-
tent. For example, the United States has expressed dissatisfaction with its
l a rge bilateral deficit with Japan, but if this deficit is to be reduced within a
system of managed rates, Japan will have to reduce its overall bilateral cur-
rent account surplus or shift that surplus to developing countries by
e x p o rting more capital to them. Those who argue for a multilateral 
a g reement on stabilizing exchange rates must take into account the nego-
tiating problems involved in reaching a consensus on the pattern of cur-
rent account balances and the willingness of the countries to adopt
m o n e t a ry, fiscal, and other policies consistent with the agre e m e n t .
The IMF’s Role in a New International Monetary System
The two most frequently discussed proposals for an active role by the
IMF in reforming the international monetary system are the proposals of
the Bretton Woods Commission and the target zone system put forth by
economists associated with the Institute for International Economics
(Williamson and Miller 1987, Williamson and Henning 1994, Bergsten
and Williamson 1994). According to the Bretton Wo ods Commission
re p o rt (1994b, A4–5), “(1) The major industrial countries should
strengthen their fiscal and monetary policies and achieve greater overall
m a c roeconomic convergence; (2) these countries should establish a
m o re formal system of coordination, involving firm and credible com-
mitments, to support these policy improvements and avoid excessive
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given a central role in coordinating macroeconomic policies and in
developing and implementing monetary reform.” 
The re p o rt suggests that the G-7 countries should grant operating
authority to the IMF for stabilizing exchange rates. However, the report
is vague re g a rding the nature and implementation of the new intern a-
tional monetary system; it merely recommends that the system should
promote exchange rate stability and avoid misaligned rates. Without for-
mally endorsing a target zone system, the report appears to favor allow-
ing some flexibility in exchange rates rather than fixing rates at
particular levels. It states that the G-7 countries would need to negotiate
a g reements among one another as to their obligations for pro m o t i n g
exchange rate stability, but the re p o rt does not say how agre e m e n t s
would be reached on the pattern of rates to be stabilized. Presumably, an
important function of the IMF would be to prepare a detailed plan for
approval by the G-7 countries.
A c c o rding to the target zone system outlined by Williamson and
Henning (1994), exchange rates would be maintained within a zone of
fluctuation based on fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs).8
The FEERs would be consistent with the current account balance of
each country and with its domestic objectives of full employment and
price stability. The finance ministers and central bank managers of the
G-7 countries would be “at the center of international monetary man-
agement.” The IMF would provide the secretariat and the forum in
which the ministers of the G-7 countries would meet to make basic pol-
icy decisions. The G-7 countries would set targets for the curre n t
account balances of the participants in the target zone regime, identify
the FEERs, and establish pro c e d u res for realigning target zones in
response to developments calling for balance of payments adjustments
(Williamson and Henning 1994, 104). The IMF would have the power
of surveillance over the exchange policies of its members. However, it
would be a council of G-7 finance ministers that would establish the tar-
get zones for the exchange rates and determine the changes in monetary
and fiscal policies needed to sustain them.
S u p p o rters of the target zone system apparently assume that the band with-
in which exchange rates fluctuate will be wide enough to accommod a t e
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p re s s u res arising from speculative capital movements and that such capital
movements will tend to reverse when an exchange rate approaches either
end of the band. One problem with this assumption is the difficulty of
defining the width of the band. A wide band, say, 20 percent, would con-
tribute little to reducing exchange rate fluctuations; a narrow band would
make it more difficult to maintain rates within the zone. There is also the
question of how frequently and under what conditions the band would be
changed. If the band is not changed quickly after the market perceives that
fundamental conditions are inconsistent with maintaining rates within the
band, the resulting large capital movements would re q u i re large off s e t t i n g
i n t e rventions. On the other hand, if the band is changed fre q u e n t l y, the
system will lose credibility and there will be little exchange rate stability
(Kenen 1994a).
Opposition to a substantial role for the IMF in a new international mon-
e t a ry system has been expressed by both economists and govern m e n t
o fficials (Mikesell 1995, 26–28). Most of the opposition concerns the
desirability or feasibility of managing exchange rates, either unilaterally
or multilaterally. One objection is that exchange rate management is
likely to be more harmful than beneficial because governments will tend
to support improper (disequilibrium) exchange rates or will continue to
support rates long after fundamental conditions change. A second objec-
tion is that the cost of the loss of freedom to use monetary and fiscal
policies for promoting domestic objectives outweighs any possible bene-
fits of currency stabilization. Some doubt that currency fluctuations sig-
nificantly impede trade since the cost of hedging contracts in fore i g n
currencies is relatively small. A third objection is that neither the IMF
nor the G-7 countries will be able to determine FEERs accurately or to
recognize when conditions dictate a change in FEERs. A fourth objec-
tion is that central bank intervention cannot maintain exchange rates in
the face of large speculative capital movements. A fifth objection is that
it may not even be possible for the major countries to reach agreement
on the pattern of exchange rates they would support, either because the
rates may not be consistent with their trade objectives or because the
monetary and fiscal policies required to support the rates are inconsistent
with domestic economic objectives.
R e p resentatives from the governments of major countries who attended
the 1994 Bretton Wo ods conference in Washington were not enthusiastic
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c reating a new international monetary system. Larry Summers, curre n t l y
U.S. deputy secre t a ry of the tre a s u ry, expressed doubts re g a rding the feasi-
bility of policy convergence in light of the EU experience (Bre t t o n
Wo ods Commission 1994a, 19). Kosuke Nakahira, the Japanese vice min-
ister of finance for international affairs, also played down a future role for
the IMF, stating that “What is important, in my view, is to have fre q u e n t
and informal contacts among policy makers, ministers of finance, and
central bank governors or their deputies, say, through G-7 meetings or
other appropriate forums, rather than to formalize or institutionalize the
c o o rdination process” (Bretton Wo ods Commission 1994a, 23). Gert
H a l l e r, the re p resentative of the German Federal Ministry of Finance,
rejected international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies and
t a rget zones on both theoretical and policy grounds (Bretton Wo od s
Commission 1994a, 21).
Since the termination of the dollar convertibility into gold in 1971, the
U.S. government has had relatively little interest in stabilizing the for-
eign exchange value of the dollar, showing concern only when the dollar
depreciated sharply. During the first Reagan administration the Treasury
D e p a rtment was against intervention in the exchange market and any
other action to reduce the value of the dollar, which in 1984 was gener-
ally re g a rded as substantially overv a l u e d .9 When James Baker became
S e c re t a ry of the Tre a s u ry in January 1985, there was a shift in the
Treasury Department’s position on the dollar. At a meeting of the G-5
countries at the Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985, the U.S.
Tre a s u ry, in cooperation with the other G-5 governments, agreed to
reduce the external value of the dollar by means of intervention, and the
dollar depreciated from 1985 to 1987 (Obstfeld 1990). The Louvre
Accord—an agreement among the G-7 countries on collective action to
stop the fall of the dollar and to stabilize G-7 currencies within reference
ranges—was reached in Febru a ry 1987, but there was little willingness
on the part of the governments to change their monetary and fiscal poli-
cies (Obstfeld 1990). After rallying in 1988, the dollar resumed its
decline in 1989 and continued to fall during the first half of the 1990s.
B a rry Eichengreen (1995) contends that there is no middle gro u n d
between freely floating rates and a unified monetary system with a com-
mon curre n c y, such as the EU is seeking to achieve. In his view, stabilizing
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M o n e t a ry unification re q u i res a high degree of political integration, which
seems far in the future, even for the EU countries. Richard Cooper (1994)
takes much the same position as Eichengreen in his criticism of the targ e t
zone system. He suggests that “in the long run, but not for the next few
years, we will desire irrevocably fixed exchange rates among the major cur-
rencies—in effect, a common currency among the industrialized democra-
cies” (Cooper 1994, 112–116). Thus, we find a fundamental conflict in
the positions taken by leading international economists about the possibil-
ity of forming an international monetary system in which there is multina-
tional coordination to stabilize exchange rates.
Without specific commitment by governments to support an exchange
rate stabilization program in which the IMF would play a major role, the
I M F ’s influence on the international monetary system is limited to
p reparing financial analyses, carrying on “formal” annual consultations
with individual members, and admonishing the finance ministers of
leading countries to take measures the ministers find incompatible with
domestic objectives. Such a limited role raises the question of whether
these functions alone justify the existence of such a large institution or
constitute a convincing argument for expanding the IMF’s resources. 
One current IMF function that should be retained is enforcement of the
rules on exchange restrictions on current transactions and on the use of
multiple exchange rates in the Articles of Agreement. These rules have
their counterpart in the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) on trade restrictions and on import subsidies and coun-
t e rvailing duties. Exchange restrictions can be used to accomplish the
same purposes as trade restrictions, and the rules for both should be
monitored and enforced. If the IMF were to be abolished or merged with
the World Bank, one way of preserving its enforcement function would
be to transfer responsibility for enforcement to the World Tr a d e
Organization (WTO).
The IMF’s Role in Crisis Pre v e n t i o n
P a rticipants in the Halifax Summit of the G-7 countries in June 1995 pro-
posed a new role for the IMF in dealing with financial crisis pre v e n t i o n
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and emergency assistance. The proposal calls for (1) “an early warning sys-
tem” for countries in danger of financial crises, including the publication
of key economic and financial data; (2) policy advice to the govern m e n t s ;
and (3) an emergency financing mechanism that would provide “faster
access to Fund arrangements with strong conditionality and large up-fro n t
disbursements in crisis situations” (International Monetary Fund 1995).
To finance the new role, the Halifax proposal requested that wealthier
nations double the $28 billion in funding now available to the IMF under
the General Arrangements to Borrowing, or GAB (an agreement between
the IMF and a group of wealthier countries), and suggested that considera-
tion be given to increasing IMF quotas. 
The Halifax proposal was initiated by the U.S. government in response
to the Mexican financial crisis of December 1994, which led to the
mobilization of some $50 billion in credits for the Mexican government.
Of this amount, about $20 billion was made available from the U.S.
Tre a s u ry Stabilization Fund, a similar amount from the IMF, and the
remainder from other countries. The IMF has responded to financial
crises before, but never with such a large amount for an emergency cre-
ated by massive private capital outflows. 
In appraising the proposed role for the IMF, it is necessary to consider
whether increased IMF surveillance and the re q u i rement that countries
make public all the relevant information on their current financial condi-
tion will reduce the incidence of financial crisis. Mexico had been re c e i v i n g
economic assistance and was being scrutinized by the IMF before the crisis, a
fact that raises the question of whether the IMF can provide an eff e c t i v e
early warning system. The IMF held consultations with Mexico just before
the crisis and there is no evidence that the IMF advised depreciation of the
peso or other changes in Mexico’s financial policies (International Monetary
Fund 1994, 81). More o v e r, there is a need to assess whether a large aid pack-
age is the most beneficial use of public international capital. Private capital
i m p o rts do not necessarily finance productive investment that will 
s t rengthen a country ’s balance of payments position. If emergency assistance
is used as it was in the Mexican case, much of it would be used to help the
c o u n t ry meet external debt obligations. Only if the capital outflow were
reversed could the IMF be repaid within a short period, but this is by no
means assured. A case has yet to be made that large financial bailouts are an
optimal use of scarce public international funds.
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Included in the multilateral sources of financial assistance to developing
countries under the jurisdiction of the IMF is the allocation of SDRs
( B retton Wo ods Commission 1994b, 16). The managing director stro n g l y
advocates creating more SDRs. One argument is that new IMF members
that missed the most recent allotment should be provided with SDRs. This
a rgument seems to consider SDRs an entitlement, which should be made
available to the former Soviet countries that recently joined the IMF. 
One argument originally backing the creation of SDRs was that a short a g e
of international re s e rves would limit world trade. The argument against
c reating additional SDRs is that there is no need for an increase in world
re s e rves and that it would not promote world trade. The idea that global
re s e rves may at times be inadequate originated during the early postwar
p e r i od when dollars and gold constituted the bulk of intern a t i o n a l
re s e rves; however, several major currencies now serve this function and
t h e re is certainly no shortage of convertible curre n c y. In addition, the cen-
tral banks have negotiated agreements for borrowing large sums from one
a n o t h e r. Shortage of re s e rves is a problem of individual countries, not of
the world at large. General expansion of SDRs would be a poor form of
f o reign aid as they are not targeted to specific purposes or to specific coun-
tries in need of assistance. Expanding the total volume of intern a t i o n a l
liquidity serves no global function and might contribute to world inflation.
P roposals for Changing the Functions and Organization of
the World Bank Gro u p
Although there are a number of proposals for changing the policies and
operations of the World Bank Group, few advocate abolishing it. The
p roposed changes fall into three categories. First are re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
that the World Bank do more to promote private investment in develop-
ing countries. This could be done by reducing its loans to state enterprises
and encouraging privatization of these enterprises. Also, the World Bank
should divert more of its re s o u rces to the IFC, since the World Bank is
not permitted to make loans to private entities without a govern m e n t
guarantee (Bretton Wo ods Commission 1994b, A1–A9 and A21–A31). 
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nomic objectives, such as reducing poverty, promoting greater equality of
opportunity, improving health and education, and maintaining the envi-
ronment. These objectives could be supported through loans to small
farms and business enterprises and wherever possible to nongovernmen-
tal cooperative institutions. Also, loans for infrastructure projects should
be provided in a way that reduces income inequality and avoids harm to
the environment. In particular, this means not making loans for multi-
purpose dams that displace small farmers, impoverish river communities,
and produce highly subsidized power for the urban upper class (Rich
1994, Mikesell and Williams 1992). 
A third category of proposal has to do with improving the efficiency of
the World Bank’s operations. These proposals include eliminating activi-
ties that duplicate those of the IMF and improving cooperation and divi-
sion of labor with other development institutions, such as the regional
development banks and UN agencies (Wapenhans 1994, C289–C304).
The World Bank’s management does not, in general, oppose any of these
p roposals and it supports their objectives. The World Bank’s new pre s i-
dent, James D. Wolfensohn, has specifically addressed facilitating private
capital flows to developing countries; making more loans directly to the
poor; increasing re s o u rces for education, health, nutrition, and family
planning programs; and avoiding making loans for infrastru c t u re pro g r a m s
that may damage the environment (Bretton Wo ods Commission 1995).
The World Bank’s management would disagree with proposals that it cease
making any loans for large infrastru c t u re projects and that it devote all of
its assistance to poverty reduction and social services (Rich 1994).
P romoting Private Investment
The World Bank is handicapped in making loans to private enterprise by
the provision in its charter requiring that all loans to private entities be
guaranteed by a member government. Private firms are often reluctant to
borrow from the World Bank because to grant the guarantee, the govern-
ment may impose conditions on the firm. The International Finance
Corporation was organized in 1956 as an affiliate of the World Bank to
overcome this handicap, but it got off to a slow start. Today the IFC is
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the fastest growing of the three independent loan organizations of the
World Bank Group, but as recently as FY 1994 its loans made up only 13
percent of total WBG loans. If the IFC’s lending, equity financing, and
loan guarantee capacity is to be expanded, it needs more capital. One
proposal calls for the World Bank to provide additional financing to the
IFC to enable it to expand operations. Another proposal seeks to permit
the IFC to increase its subordinated debt (Bretton Woods Commission
1994b, 28). Both these alternatives could expand IFC operations without
obtaining new general capital from its shareholders—the major industrial
countries. It might be possible for the World Bank to use its own borrow-
ing capacity to raise funds for loans to the IFC, but this would probably
re q u i re an amendment to the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, a near-
impossible task.
Expanding Social and Economic Objectives
A common criticism of the World Bank is that it has been unsuccessful
in reducing world povert y, a goal it now claims as its major objective.
C o n c e i v a b l y, the World Bank could direct most of its assistance to small
f a rmers and to creating jobs for the urban unemployed; stop making
loans for natural re s o u rce development and irrigation systems that bene-
fit large commercial farmers; and devote more re s o u rces to supplying
clean water, health services, sewage disposal, and housing in small vil-
lages. The difficulty with this approach is that social welfare cannot
i m p rove unless productivity and national output increase. Impro v e m e n t
re q u i res more goods and services provided by agriculture, industry, tech-
n o l o g y, and imports. In poor countries social welfare cannot be
i m p roved simply by a transfer of income from the rich to the poor.
Without sufficient power and transportation, there will be little fore i g n
investment and domestic savers will move their capital abroad. There
must be large-scale irrigation to expand agriculture for both domestic
consumption and export, and there must be new agricultural and indus-
trial technology to make exports competitive. It may well be that the
World Bank does not have the right balance between projects that con-
tribute to social well-being and poverty reduction on the one hand and
p roductivity and growth on the other, but there is no question that it
cannot promote sustainable development by devoting all its eff o rts to
the form e r.
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P robably the most publicized criticism of the World Bank is that it has
financed environmentally destructive projects, such as large dams that
displace poor people, logging operations in tropical forests, livestock
p rojects that erode the soil, and resettlement projects that destro y
f o rests and the habitat of indigenous people (Mikesell and Wi l l i a m s
1992). The World Bank has admitted that it has made many enviro n-
mental mistakes in the past and, over the last several years, has made
considerable pro g ress not only in avoiding those mistakes, but in taking
positive steps to assure a sound environment. Most of its project loans
now are subject to environmental impact assessments and, through its
p a rticipation in the Global Environment Facility (GEF), in coopera-
tion with the UN Environment Programme and the UN Development
P rogramme, it subsidizes investment in projects deemed beneficial to
the global enviro n m e n t .
Some environmentalists argue that the World Bank creates a stro n g
incentive for developing countries to overexploit their forests and other
natural resources because the external debt created by the loans must be
serviced by expanding natural resource exports (Rich 1994, Pearce et al.
1995); the development lending institutions should therefore stop creat-
ing additional developing country indebtedness. To a considerable
d e g ree, this is an argument against development itself rather than
against international lending organizations. All development re q u i re s
increased imports of goods and services, which in turn must be paid for
by increased exports, which in the case of poor countries generally take
the form of natural re s o u rces. Poor countries need external capital to
supplement their low saving, and both external loans and direct invest-
ments increase external liabilities. Developing countries will export
their natural resources whether or not the international banks lend to
them, and it is often more advantageous to have those projects financed
by international development banks, which insist on enviro n m e n t a l
standards, than to have the projects designed without such oversight.
An important argument in favor of increasing the resources of both the
World Bank and the IMF is that such funding would enable them to
meet a portion of the enormous demand for capital in the former Soviet
countries and those countries that came under Soviet control after
World War II. Unlike developing countries, which have a tradition of
private enterprise, commodity and financial markets, pro p e rty and 
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transactions law, and a commercial credit system, the former Soviet
countries need to develop all of the elements that define a modern capi-
talist economy. Private firms that operate in competitive markets, service
debt, attract private capital, and earn profits must be created, often from
former state-owned enterprises. 
The first task of an external lending institution would be to pro v i d e
advice and technical assistance for creating an institutional and policy
e n v i ronment in which a capitalist enterprise could operate. Loans
should be conditional on perf o rmance in changing the economic and
political stru c t u re of the economy. This is difficult for an intern a t i o n a l
a g e n c y. It is easier for the World Bank to tell Bolivia or Kenya to stop
c o n t rolling prices or reduce fiscal deficits as a condition for a loan than
it is to impose such conditions on Russia for a large loan. A large loan
to Russia has political significance, both internally and extern a l l y,
because of its possible effects on the strategic interests of the leading
We s t e rn powers. Because of this significance, the lending standards of
multilateral institutions may well be compromised. Both the Wo r l d
Bank and the IMF have been criticized as being either too tough or too
soft in imposing conditions on loans to Eastern Europe. There f o re, an
a rgument can be made that transition assistance to the countries of the
f o rmer Soviet Union should take the form of either direct assistance
f rom We s t e rn countries or assistance through the European Bank for
R e c o n s t ruction and Development, which was specifically created to
assist these countries. In discussing this question, Kalman Mizsei
(1994) observed, “While it is obviously true that there is good cause to
t reat Russia diff e rently (i.e., because it is a country that has the mili-
t a ry capability to destroy the world), if We s t e rn governments decide
that Russia should be treated pre f e re n t i a l l y, the necessary funds for
Russia should come from those governments dire c t l y. ”
I m p roving Efficiency of Operations
Several proposals have been made for improving the World Bank’s
e fficiency: eliminate activities that duplicate those of the IMF,
i m p rove cooperation and division of labor with other development
institutions, and determine if certain existing World Bank activities
exceed their mandate.
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The World Bank makes loans with IDA funds for much the same pur-
poses as it makes loans from its own resources, which means that most of
the criticisms of World Bank operations and loan priorities apply to the
IDA. Special criticisms of the IDA relate to the generous terms on
which assistance is made available. IDA credits have a 50-year maturity,
with repayments required no earlier than 10 years after the loan has been
made. No interest is charged, but there is a 0.75 percent administration
fee. Given these terms, IDA loans (based on a 12 percent rate of dis-
count) are nearly 90 percent grants. Only the poorest countries are eligi-
ble for IDA loans, as eligibility is based on per capita income. It may be
a rgued that since any capital investment should yield a re t u rn at least
equal to the cost of borrowing, foreign aid that is virtually a grant is 
likely to be used to finance low-yield projects and, therefore, may consti-
tute a misallocation of re s o u rces. Countering this position is the arg u-
ment that poor countries need social projects that will yield positive
returns from higher productivity only after a long period of time; there-
fore, these projects should be financed by the IDA or by outright grants. 
Critics have argued that the IMF and the World Bank should not both be
engaged in providing financial assistance to developing countries. IMF
o fficials insist that SAFs do not constitute development aid because such
financing promotes balance of payments adjustments that are compatible
with development objectives. This argument is largely semantic. While
the conditions attached to the IMF’s SAFs tend to emphasize monetary,
fiscal, and exchange rate policies and the World Bank’s structural adjust-
ment loans give greater emphasis to the allocation of capital among eco-
nomic sectors, both institutions seek to realize development objectives
that re q u i re a combination of governmental policies and initiatives. 
Not only is there considerable overlap between the IMF and the Wo r l d
Bank in these development operations, but a few cases of actual conflict
have been documented.1 0 As stated by Gustav Ranis (1994, C75), “the
Bank used to concentrate on projects, leaving balance of payments issues
and related macro advice to the IMF . . . it has lately become incre a s i n g l y
d i fficult to tell the diff e rence between the two institutions.” According to
G e o rge Schultz (1995, 5–6), “the overlapping activities of the Bank and
Fund, a change in the traditional mission of the IMF, and the need to use
s c a rce re s o u rces carefully all argue for a merger of these institutions.”
Schultz would transfer the functions of the IMF to the World Bank.
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institutions on the grounds that the IMF can provide unique services to
developing countries (Polak 1994). Nevertheless, the re p o rt re c o g n i z e s
the need for a more clearly defined division of labor. The report recom-
mends that the IMF “focus squarely on short-term macroeconomic stabi-
lization” and “the Bank should not duplicate the Fund’s macroeconomic
analysis, but should rely on it in its program planning and project design.
The IMF, in turn, should depend on the WBG to provide financial and
technical assistance to the recipient countries to mitigate the impact of
m a c roeconomic adjustment on the poor and the environment.” The
commission was concerned that duplication of eff o rt could become a
serious problem “when a country’s financial imbalance is structural and,
t h e re f o re, longer term in nature.” In these cases, the IMF “should not
pursue independent programs, but its macroeconomic advice should
become part of a longer- t e rm adjustment strategy led by the WBG”
(Bretton Woods Commission 1994b, B19).
A complete merger of the IMF with the WBG would re q u i re either re d r a f t-
ing the charters of both institutions or terminating the IMF and re s t ru c t u r-
ing the World Bank. Approval by the legislative bodies of member
countries would be extremely difficult to obtain.1 1 The easiest way to
accomplish a merger of their current activities would be to bring the IMF
into the WBG as a separate entity, similar to the IFC. Integrating the IMF
and WBG could be accomplished by having a single set of executive dire c-
tors for the IMF and the World Bank. The task of integrating re s e a rch staff s
and administrative bureaucracies could be left to the executive board, but
the sources of funds for the IM F and the World Bank could remain as stated
in their charters. Such a merger could be accomplished by a simple amend-
ment to the charters and without comprehensive re d r a f t i n g .
Since the objective of the World Bank and the IDA is to help all devel-
oping countries become developed, they should eventually go out of
business. Rupert Pennant-Rea, deputy governor of the Bank of England,
recently stated, “In applauding much of what the Bank has done in its
fifty years, I add the hope that it will not live for another fifty years—
because it won’t need to” (Bretton Woods Commission 1994a, 46). 
One way of reducing financial assistance from the World Bank and the
IDA is to “graduate” members who are currently receiving loans.
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a rrangement but, rather, was designed to help the poorest countries
achieve a condition of positive growth, indefinite dependence on IDA
funds suggests a failure of the program. “Graduated” countries could still
receive World Bank loans for a time, but that form of assistance also
would eventually be cut off. A number of countries, for example, Korea
and Taiwan, no longer receive loans from the World Bank, and the num-
ber of countries eligible for World Bank loans could be re d u c e d .
However, downsizing the World Bank raises questions about the distribu-
tion of assistance; that is, if a downsized World Bank provides substantial
financing to Eastern Europe, it may have little left to lend to developing
countries.
C o n c l u s i o n s
My conclusions on the proposals for reforming the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions cannot be stated with unequivocal conviction or passion. The
issues are too complex, the arguments in favor of opposing positions too
persuasive, and the reputations of those holding conflicting views too
impressive. Most financial specialists who have considered the future of
the WBG and the IMF accept the principle that there should be multi-
lateral institutions to promote world trade and reduce world povert y
(see, for example, Kenen 1994b). The Bretton Woods institutions, the
WTO, and the GATT are the principal institutions created for these
purposes. Given the large financial resources and the highly competent
staffs of the IMF and the World Bank, they should be doing a better job
promoting trade and reducing poverty. To this end, I propose the follow-
ing changes in their policies, structure, and operations.
1. The WBG and the IMF should be merged, with each executive
director (currently there are 24 for the World Bank and 23 for the
IMF) serving as an executive director for both institutions.
I suggest that the new organization be called the World Bank and Fund
G roup (WBFG) to pre s e rve the identity of the two major institutions.
The WBFG would also include IDA, IFC, and MIGA. Nothing in 
the charters of either institution would prohibit such a change. The
chair of the joint board would serve as the CEO of the combined 
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ties. (The members of the boards of governors of the World Bank and
the IMF, who are in most cases the ministers of finance of the member
countries, have always served as governors for both institutions.) Since
both the World Bank and the IMF would still operate in accord a n c e
with their respective charters, it would not be necessary to re n e g o t i a t e
the Articles of Agreement. The financial accounts of each org a n i z a-
tion would be kept separately and all financial transactions would be in
a c c o rdance with the charters of the individual organizations. The staff s
of the two organizations would be completely integrated, although paid
f rom diff e rent sources. The president of the World Bank, the managing
d i rector of the IMF, and the chair of the joint board would serve as the
g o v e rning council. Responsibility for enforcing the IMF’s rules on
exchange restrictions and multiple exchange rates would be given to
the WTO. 
2. The IMF should not be given the responsibility for establishing and
managing an exchange rate target zone system or for stabilizing the
exchange rates of the major currencies.
Proposed changes in the international monetary system involving multi-
lateral control over the exchange rates of the major countries are un-
likely to succeed for three reasons. First, it is unlikely that the IMF or
any other agency would be able to determine a pattern of FEERs that
would be consistent with a given pattern of current account balance tar-
gets. Second, it is unlikely that any set of pro c e d u re and policy guide-
lines could maintain market exchange rates in reasonable proximity to a
pattern of exchange rate targets without frequent changes in the pattern
or without very large commitments of re s e rves for intervention in the
exchange markets. Third, it is highly unlikely that the major countries
could agree on a pattern of target exchange rates or adopt the policies
necessary to control market rates when these policies were not in accord
with their domestic objectives.
M o re o v e r, even if an acceptable pattern of rates could be established,
the IMF would not be the appropriate institution to enforce that pat-
t e rn. First, the IMF has little or no influence over the policies of the
major powers and should not be asked by the G-7 countries to under-
take responsibility for creating an international monetary system that
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Second, coordination of monetary and fiscal policies for achieving
exchange rate objectives is not possible for sovereign nations, except
p e rhaps for those forming an economic and political union.
3. The establishment of a special IM F facility to deal with financial
crises should be deferred.
I have reservations regarding the special facility proposed at the Halifax
Summit for assisting countries experiencing financial crises. The IMF
a l ready has the authority to assist countries experiencing financial
shocks from whatever source, but it should not devote large amounts of
its resources for crises engendered by capital flight. Free capital markets
inevitably involve risks to both creditors and debtors; eff o rts to lessen
these risks with public international funds may result in the unproduc-
tive use of scarce resources.
4. Development success has been shown to be closely associated with
private investment. There f o re, the WBG should move rapidly to
change the composition of its lending by making fewer loans to gov-
ernments and state enterprises and increasing its loans to the private
sector, including nongovernmental, nonprofit entities. 
The World Bank should increase the proportion of its profits invested in
the IFC. The capital of the IFC should be increased, either by additional
subscription or by arrangements under which the World Bank would
borrow funds from the market to relend to the IFC.
5. There should be a gradual downsizing of the WBG by reducing the
number of countries eligible for loans. 
As countries reach a path of sustained development, they should no
longer be receiving multilateral financial assistance. Also, the United
States and other governments are more likely to reduce than to
i n c rease their contributions to multilateral development org a n i z a t i o n s
in the future. There f o re, the number of countries eligible for WBG
loans should be decreased. IDA replenishments should be gradually
reduced, working toward eliminating the IDA within the next couple
of decades. 
Proposals for Reforming the International Monetary Institutions
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 35
PPB No.24  2/17/99  3:13 PM  Page 35A possible constraint on reducing (or not increasing) the re s o u rces of the
World Bank is the role the WBG is expected to play in the transition of
the former Soviet bloc countries to capitalism. This financial constraint
poses a political question that ought to be faced by the G-7 countries. In
my view, financial assistance for the transition should be provided by the
major We s t e rn powers and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Financial assistance from the WBG should be delayed
until these countries have achieved political and economic stability and
have acquired the institutions, markets, and degree of privatization that
would define them as functioning private market economies.
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N o t e s
1. The Washington, D.C., conference was sponsored by the Bretton Wo od s
Commission and was held at the U.S. Department of State on July 20–22,
1994. A conference sponsored by the Institute for Agriculture and Tr a d e
Policy was held at the Mt. Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods on October
15–17, 1994. Madrid was the site of the annual meeting of the Board of
Governors of the IMF and the World Bank in October 1994.
2. The IMF par value system required each member to define the par value of
its currency in terms of gold or of the U.S. dollar in terms of the gold content
in effect in July 1944 (1/35 of an ounce). Members agreed to maintain their
exchange rates within a range of 1 percent above and below parity.
3. SDRs are allocated to the members of the IMF in accordance with an amend-
ment to the Articles of Agreement in May 1968. An IMF member wanting
to acquire the currency of another member may transfer SDRs to that mem-
ber in exchange for that member’s currency. Each member has an obligation
to accept SDRs up to an amount equal to twice its own SDR allocation.
Normally, only developing countries use SDRs to obtain convertible curren-
cies. The first allocation of 9.5 billion SDRs was made over a three-year 
period starting January 1, 1970, and the second over a three-year period start-
ing in 1979, for a cumulative total of 21.4 billion SDRs. As of May 1995, one
SDR = $1.47. 
4. For a review of alternative exchange rate arrangements, see Frankel (1994, Ch. 5).
5. The current account includes services and investment income as well as trade.
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of output. Taxes (T) tend to reduce both C and I. If G i n c reases while T
remains constant, C + I will not decrease to offset the increase in G a n d ,
therefore, CA will decrease or perhaps become negative. If G is greater than
T, there is a budget deficit, G – T. The larger the budget deficit, the lower
(or more negative) CA will become, unless there is an increase in Y.
7. In November 1977 the Fed and Tre a s u ry Department launched a massive
program to reverse the sharp decline in the dollar with a combination of for-
eign exchange intervention and credit restraint (in the form of an increase in
the discount rate). This action, however, was not necessarily at variance with
P resident Cart e r’s antiinflationary program underway at the time (Mikesell
1995, 18–19).
8. FEERs are not, strictly speaking, “equilibrium” rates, but are as close to equilib-
rium rates as can be surmised, given that the other, specified conditions are met.
9. The Council of Economic Advisers (1984) estimated that the dollar was
overvalued by more than 30 percent. This view was rejected by the Treasury
Department, whose officials believed that a strong dollar was desirable and
that a U.S. trade deficit was not a problem to be concerned about.
10. In 1988 the World Bank announced a $1.25 billion loan package for Arg e n t i n a
at the same time it was known that the IMF considered the country ’s policies
inadequate for a new standby arrangement with the IMF (Polak 1994, C153).
11. To gain legislative approval would require opening the Articles of Agreement
of both institutions to change by the legislative bodies of member countries.
This could result in demands for further changes and, in the case of the 
present U.S. Congress, a possible move to abolish both institutions.
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